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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER-A Study in Legal
Ethics: Henry Wynans Jessup, M.A., J.D. 1926. New York, G. A.
Jennings Co., Inc.
Conditions at the bar are bad. We are told so by professors at the
law school and leaders of the bar. Are they as bad as they were a century
ago? De Witt Clinton, in "An Introductory Discourse" delivered before the
Literary and Philosophical Society of New York on May 4, 1814, said:
A periodical writer, who published in 1752, estimated the number
of families in this city to be two thousand, and the number of physicians
to be forty; which would make one physician for every fifty families;
and he further stated that he could show, by "probable arguments, that
more lives are destroyed in this city by pretended physicians, than by
all other causes whatever." Nor was the profession of the law on a
more respectable footing. As there was no distinction of degrees, the
attorney and the counsellor were blended together; and the profession
was disgraced by the admission of men not only of the meanest abilities,
but of the lowest employments.
In 1786, the citizens of Braintree, Massachusetts, in town meeting, solemnly
resolved':
We humbly request that there may be such Laws compiled as may
crush or at -least put a proper check or restraint on that order of Gentlemen denominated Lawyers the completion of whose modern conduct appears to us to tend rather to the destruction than the preservation of
this Commonwealth.
About this time Dedham instructed its legislative representatives to
endeavor that such regulations be introduced into our Courts of Law,
and that such restraints be laid on the order of lawyers as that we may
have recourse to the Laws -and find our security and not our ruin in
them
and if
such a measure should appear impracticable, you are to endeavor that
the order of Lawyers be totally abolished * * *
Benjamin -Austin (Honestus) published occasionally in The Independent
Chronicle, in the year 1786, "Observations on The Pernicious Practice of
the Law." In 1814 these were republished "at the request of a number of
respectable citizens" Honestus says:
I am far from abolishing any "order" wherein real learning can
any way he promoted; the present practice of the law cannot come
within this idea, it being in no way a stimulus to promote that knowledge
which can benefit society; it consists more in the sly art of sophistry,
than in the genuine principles of fair and unequivocal arguments. The
sentiments of the law are too generally studied with a view to pervert
them by false glosses and plausible cavils-In short, they are too often
read by this "order" with a design to warp them to their own purposes and private emolument.
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So if conditions today are bad, they are only relatively bad. They are
very much better than they were a century ago or even a decade ago.
Standards for admission to the bar are higher and we know more about the
ethics of the bar. Thanks to the effective work of bar associations throughout the country, we have an intelligent appreciation of the elements that enter
into the decision of ethical problems daily confronting the lawyer. More
than good character is required-understanding of the nature of his obligations and of the principles that are involved in the decision of ethical
problems.
The outstanding laboratory in which experimentation has been carried
on for fifteen years is the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York County Lawyers' Association, of which Henry Wynans Jessup has
been a leading member. This group was born of the movement originated
by Dr. Felix Adler, at whose suggestion there was formed, in 1908, a "group
of lawyers, who meet * * * to discuss among themselves the practical
questions that come under their observation, where the application of principles of ethics to actual situations becomes necessary or advisable."
Through the efforts of Mr. Boston, who was a member of the "Lawyers'
Group," the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York County
Lawyers' Association, of which he was chairman, was in 1912 empowered,
"when consulted, to advise inquirers respecting questions of proper professional conduct. * * * "
Through the work of this committee, through his work in the American
Bar Association and his work in the New York State Bar Association, Mr.
Jessup can truly be regarded as an expert on the subject of professional ethics.
His book is most timely. The recent resignation of a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness in the Second Department, based, as it is,
upon statements highly controversial concerning the fitness of men now
applying for admission to the bar, nevertheless, like a searchlight, concentrates attention upon a selected spot. Whether we agree with him or not,
we all agree that applicants for admission to the bar must show qualification
not merely in knowledge of the law and intellectual equipment, but must
possess the essential moral character requisite for the incumbent of this high
office. But, as we have said, character alone is not sufficient. Knowledge
of the principles and of their application to given sets of facts is essential.
Here is a book which can be put in the hands of the student, which can
be used in the classroom, which enables him to answer the problems as they
arise, and which will prepare him for his important tasks as his legal training prepares him in that branch of his education. The thorough reference
lists and appendices constitute a compendium of practically all the available
data on the subject. The book, moreover, is interesting. Based on his
experience as a member of the Committee on Professional Ethics, Mr.
Jessup pursues the method of hypothetical question and answer. The Moot
Court questions in Part II to be resolved by discussion and the legal questions to be looked up (Part IV) are both provocative of thought and further
study on the part of the law student. The treatment is dignified, practical
and cultural. In these days, when the tendency is to commercialize the profession and its opportunities, a book of this sort is not only timely hut invaluable.
In thus praising the author's work, the reviewer must confess to bias.
First, he knows the author and knows his standing and his efficiency through
intimate contact in the same field. Second, the author has already put the
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reviewer in his debt by most complimentary and flattering references to the
reviewer's own work. Nevertheless, the reviewer insists that this is a fair
critique of Mr. Jessup's book.
JuLIus HENRY COHEN.

CASES ON EQUITY.
Law School.

A one volume edition by Professor Cook of the Yale

With the evolution of the modern case book, one may well reflect
whether the early English case has been dethroned from its lofty position
in the world of legal education. It may not yet be a shattered idol, but the
signs that it is tottering are many. It will always be with us as the rock
upon which much of our law was huilded, but once supplanted by the
modern case, it will no longer wield the masterful influence that it had in
the past. It might be rash to say it has outlived its usefulness and it may
be heretical to say that it quietly passed away with the last generation of
law teachers, but if it has, who will there be to mourn at its bier? In its
day it has received its meed of adulation from great teachers and great
judges, and it has found its resting place in the case books of an earlier
day. And perhaps it is just as well. Hoary with age, speaking in the
hardly understandable tongue of centuries ago, part Latin of doubtful
quality, part English, long obsolete, nearly always obscure in its meaning
and facts, let it rest in peace with a tribute to its historical and cultural
value. How could it be expected to resist the avalanche of decisions that
have come down within the last century and a quarter? For so many
of these have been phrased in clear, lucid language, oftentimes with some
pretensions to literary style, with an ample statement of facts and frequently an exposition of the historical and philosophical significance of the
point under discussion, that beside them many an early case appears like
a curio of uncertain value. It may arouse a polite curiosity in the law
student, or even perhaps amuse him, hut as the vehicle of transmitting
legal knowledge, it is interesting chiefly because of its respectable past.
Equity and real prolierty were its fertile fields. Was any case book on
Equity complete that did not revel in cases decided centuries ago with
modem cases interpolated here and there to give it the appearance of a well
balanced book. But after all, this was quite in accord with the best
traditions of the law teachers and quite consonant with their methods.
Professor Cook in the preface to one of his earlier volumes of cases
on Equity suggests that the present generation of law teachers now treat
their subjects in a different spirit from that of their elders, notably Keener
and Ames. In those books he abandoned the historical method of approach
which was so familiar to law students of a generation ago. He has
continued the same plan in a one volume selection of Cases on Equity
recently issued by him. The comparative advantage of Professor Cook's
treatment of the subject as compared with the old order is so obvious that
it needs no apologist. One of the younger men in the teaching of law,
his earlier books indicate a definite and forceful purpose of breaking away
from what has been the orthodox and eminently proper plan of preparing
a selection of cases on equitable jurisprudence. There will be few or
none to quarrel with him, for unless one is blind to the rapidly changing
phases of the social and economical structure, he must realize that a present-day survey of any field of the law must embrace many situations and

